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1 INTRODUCTION 
Populism has recently enjoyed successes in Europe, in the US, and beyond. Populist leaders and their 
supporters have accused "mainstream" media of being part of a "corrupt" elite that misrepresents the 
will of the virtuous "people". Distrust of the media has also led to the rejection of traditional media 
sources for political information and given prominence to alternative or hyperpartisan sources such 
as Breitbart. These alternatives have become important media outlets for populist party leaders and 
their supporters. However, there is limited research about who consumes hyperpartisan media, how 
the audience of hyperpartisan media is interconnected, and the content of hyperpartisan media. By 
combining an analysis of a survey with website visits and website content (building on previous work, 
Stier, Kirkizh, Froio & Schroeder 2020; Yan, Schroeder & Stier 2021) this paper shows the link 
between populist party support and hyperpartisan media visits. 
2 RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Our main research questions, led by previous research (including de Vreese, Esser, Aalberg, & 
Stanyer, 2018; Holt,Ustad Figenschou, & Frischlich, 2019) are: (RQ1) What are the audiences for 
hyperpartisan websites? Once we have answered this question, we ask, in (RQ2), what is the network 
of hyperpartisan websites as measured by their shared audiences? Finally, we examine, in (RQ3), 
what is the media agenda of hyperpartisan media? 
  
3 CONCLUSIONS 
In the full paper, we will present extensive findings from our study. These findings provide a rich and 
detailed picture of the political support and media trust of visitors to hyperpartisan websites and the 
network structure and content of hyperpartisan news media during our period of study. Here we 
briefly summarize our main conclusions and implications: Our study shows that the reach of hy-
perpartisan media, measured by the percentage of panellists who visited hyperpartisan news domains, 
is 5.32%. We find a statistically significant link between support for right-wing populist parties and 
visits to hyper-partisan media while the association between left-wing populist party support and 
hyperpartisan media visits is much weaker. More importantly perhaps, we find that distrust in public 
broadcasters and trust in social media both increase the likelihood of visiting hyperpartisan media 
websites, particularly among right-wing populist party supporters. There is also a larger context for 
our study, which is that the period under consideration was a highly volatile one in American politics: 
the Mueller report into President Trump’s connections with Russia was a focus of controversy, with 
the findings of the report and resulting implications eagerly anticipated by different political factions. 
One obvious feature of the vast bulk of hyperpartisan content in this regard is its negative and critical 
orientation: attack on elite progressive causes which are perceived as extreme is pervasive, while the 
much less prominent left-oriented hyperpartisan sites are geared towards motivating political activ-
ists. Partisan-fuelled false news and conspiracy theories also feature prominently on hyperpartisan 
news websites. Further, topic modelling results suggest that while hyperpartisan sites in European 
countries disproportionately focused on Muslims and immigration, conspiracy theories on hyperpar-
tisan news in the US centred around party politics (such as news content about the “deep state”). 
Further, the reach of certain hyperpartisan networks and their content attract attention across national 
and, it seems, linguistic, boundaries, even if linguistic boundaries are still the stronger shapers of 
reach and attention. All in all, at a time when there is intense contention about the nature of impar-
tiality and objectivity in news and about political partisanship, our analysis adds to this body of re-
search the finding that, especially for right-wing populist supporters, there is what could be called a 
parallel universe of hyperpartisan websites providing political information that has drifted away from 
the ‘mainstream’ of news journalism. 
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